Justifying the dependability of computer-based systems: with applications in nuclear engineering

What evidence is sufficient to justify the release of a computer-based safetycritical system? How should this evidence be presented to certification bodies or regulatory authorities? What best practices should be applied? These are just a few of the questions addressed by Justifying the Dependability of Computer-based Systems, which provides a framework for the justification of the dependability of a computer-based system. The book also explores some of the morefundamental aspects of safety evaluation, such as the nature of claims, arguments and evidence, and the ways to deal with different types of uncertainty. Justifying the Dependability of Computer-based Systems will be of value to software and computer system engineers working in industry sectors such as nuclearsafety. Provides a framework for the justification of the dependability of a computer system Author is a consultant to the OECD and the IAEA and has published over 100 papers on computers and communications in nuclear and safety engineering INDICE: Part I: The Context.- Introduction.- Current Practices.- AxiomaticJustification and Uncertainty.- Justification and Dependability Case.- Part II: Prescriptions.- Requirements, Claims and Evidence.- Arguments, Syntax and Semantics.- Axiomatic Principles and Limits.- Part III: Descriptions.- Structures and Interpretations.- Embedded Computer System Structures.- Part IV: Methodological Implications.- Pre-existing Systems and Components.- Construction Methods.- Postface.

• ISBN: 978-1-84800-371-2
• Editorial: Springer
• Encuadernacion: Cartoné
• Páginas: 340
• Fecha Publicación: 01/10/2008
• Nº Volúmenes: 1
• Idioma: Inglés