Strategic social choice: stable representations of constitutions

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game formsthat are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincereoutcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution. This is the first monograph on the subject of constitutions modeled by effectivity functions It reviews and extends the literature on thisissue from the beginning, around 30 years ago It is especially relevant for researchers, including PhD students, in the area of game theory and social choice theory INDICE: Preview of this book.- Representations of constitutions: Introduction to Part I; Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms; Nash consistent representations; Acceptable representations; Strongly consistent representations; Nash consistent representation through lottery models; On the continuity of representations of constitutions.- Consistent voting: Introduction toPart II; Feasible elimination procedures; Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions; Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters.

• ISBN: 978-3-642-13874-4
• Editorial: Springer
• Encuadernacion: Cartoné
• Páginas: 160
• Fecha Publicación: 01/08/2010
• Nº Volúmenes: 1
• Idioma: Inglés